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CHAPTER ONE 
SEARCHES WITHOUT WARRANTS 
Jerold Israel* 
Basis of the Warrant Requirement 
Although they are surely well-known to this 
audience, I take note at the outset of two basic 
principles that are the foundation for all that 
follows. First, under Ker v. California,! fourth 
amendment standards governing the constitutionality 
of searches are applicable to the states, and the 
states must, at a minimum~ meet those standards. The 
states can impose a more restrictive standard, but 
they cannot impose a more lenient standard. Second, 
evidence obtained by a search which does not meet 
federal constitutional standards will not be admissible 
at trial. For many years there was some question in 
Michigan about the exclusion of certain types of 
evidence found outside dwellings, due to a special 
exception found in the Michigan Constitution.2 That 




Professor of Law, The University of Michigan 
Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
374 u.s. 23 (1963). 
Mich. Canst. 1963, Art. 1, §ll: " ••• The provi-
sions of this section shall not be construed to 
bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any 
narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any 
other dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer 
outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in 
this state." 
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3 case. 
My primary area of concentration today is the 
search made without a warrant. Studies indicate that 
95 percent or more of all searches are without war-
rants. It is quite understandable, then, that most 
of the search-and-seizure litigation concerns the 
validity of searches without warrants. 
The fourth amendment has two conjunctive clauses. 
The first guarantees the right of the people against 
unreasonable searches, and the second sets forth the 
conditions under which a warrant may issue. Only 
the second clause specifically refers to warrants. 
There has been considerable controversy over the years 
concerning the relationship between those two clauses. 
That relationship has been a source of division with-
in both the United States Supreme Court and the Mich-
igan appellate courts. One group of judges and jus-
tices has argued that the amendment does not create 
a special presumption favoring warrants: the first 
clause imposes a single, basic standard--reasonable-
ness--and that standard can be readily met with or 
without a warrant. Another group of judges and jus-
tices has argued that the two clauses are closely 
related and the second clause referring to warrants 
largely defines the reasonableness requirement of the 
first. 
Michigan decisions have generally tended to 
favor the former view.4 Opinions have been concerned 
primarily with the presence of probable cause, not 
with the failure of the officer to obtain a warrant. 
On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court, 
in the last few years, has definitely favored the 
latter approach, emphasizing the need for obtaining 
a warrant even where probable cause is clearly estab-
lished. Illustrative is Justice Stewart's statement 
3. People v. Pennington, 383 Mich. 611 (1970), rev'g 
17 Mich. App. 398 (1969). 
4. See e.g., People v. Cook, 24 Mich. App. 40~ 
(1970). 
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in Katz v. United States 5: 
••• this Court has never sustained 
a search upon the sole ground that offi-
cers reasonably expected to find evidence 
of a particular crime and voluntarily 
confined their activities to the least 
intrusive means consistent with that end. 
Searches conducted without warrants have 
been held unlawful "notwithstanding facts 
unquestionably showing probable cause, ••• " 
for the Constitution requires "that the 
deliberate, impartial judgment of a judi-
cial officer ••• be interposed between the 
citizen and the police •••• " ••• "Over and 
over again this Court has emphasized that 
the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment 
requires adherence to judicial processes", 
••• and that searches conducted outside 
the judicial process, without prior approval 
by judge or magistrate, are per se un-
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment--
subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions. 
Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement 
Although the United States Supreme Court is 
divided on this issue, Justice Stewart's position 
appears to be prevailing and it is, therefore, the 
view to which counsel must adapt their arguments. In 
particular, prosecutors, in defending searches without 
warrants, must be prepared to bring such searches 
within the "specifically established and well-delin-
eated exceptions," noted Stewart, rather than simply 
point to the "general reasonableness" of the officer's 
action without particular regard for the lack of a 
warrant. 
Although Justice Stewart refers to a "few 
5. 389 u.s. 347, 356-7 (1967). 
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specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions," there are several such exceptions justifying 
searches without a warrant. Most are well-established, 
but how well they are delineated is a matter of some 
debate. The search incident to an arrest is the most 
frequently used exception. Another is the moving 
vehicle exception, although it is probably best 
classified as one illustration of a larger category, 
the search without a warrant justified by "exigent 
circumstances." Another in this category is the 
search in the process of hot pursuit of a wanted 
person. Another exception is the custodial search. 
Included in this category are the inventory search 
of the person at the station and the search of the 
impounded vehicle. Consent to search also justifies 
lack of a warrant. Of course, if there is voluntary 
consent, the state need not show even probable cause. 
Similarly, there are those investigations that are 
not characterized as searches, such as observation, 
which may lead directly to seizure of material in 
open view (which also does not require a warrant) • 
Rather than explore each exception in all of 
its applications, I would like to consider warrant-
less searches of three basic "subjects"--the person, 
the car, and the building (whether office or home)--
and examine the application of the relevant exceptions 
(excluding consent, which Judge Reisig will cover) 
to the search of each. 
Search of the Person 
Stop and Fl'isk 
Let us start with the search of the person. 
First, consider the possible bearing of the last 
exception noted previously--investigative activities 
that are not treated as full-fledged searches. Most 
significant here is the so-called 1'frisk" of the 
person. The constitutionality of the frisk was 
established in Tel'l'Y v. Ohio.6 A police officer 
6. 392 u.s. 1 (1968). 
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observed three men in a downtown shopping area en-
gaged in what he believed was the ''casing" of a 
store for robbery. He approached them for ques-
tioning. But after an initial mumbled response, he 
frisked them; that is, he engaged in a "pat down." 
He felt a pistol in a breast pocket and removed a 
loaded weapon, which was introduced as evidence at 
trial. The officer obviously did not have a warrant 
and he could not justify his action as a search 
incident to an arrest because he lacked probable 
cause to make an arrest and had not made one. The 
Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the seizure of the 
weapon. It stressed that the frisk was subject to 
the fourth amendment, but lacked the intensity of a 
full search. Accordingly, the officer did not need 
full-fledged probable cause nor the warrant required 
for a full-fledged search. The Court held that when 
a police officer has reason to believe that the per-
son with whom he is dealing (here, questioning) is 
armed and dangerous, he may make a frisk even though 
he does not have probable cause to arrest that per-
son. He may do this for his own safety and the 
safety of others but he is limited to a frisk of the 
outer clothing in his attempt to discover weapons. 
It is important to note that that case dealt 
with authority to frisk, not with the authority to 
stop. The Supreme Court left open the question of 
when an officer on less than probable cause can 
force a person to stop so that questions could be 
asked. In Terry itself he did not have to stop the 
individuals. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, 
suggested that the Court could not logically sustain 
the frisk without also sustaining the stop. His 
view seems likely to prevail if the Court remains as 
presently composed. Of course, if the initial stop 
were invalid, then the subsequent frisk might also 
fall as the fruit of the poisonous tree. 
The validity of the stop may also be crucial in 
sustaining another investigative technique that is 
not viewed as a search and therefore does not require 
a warrant. Take the case where the officer says, 
"I didn't search anybody. I stopped him to ask for 
an explanation of suspicious activity. He opened 
up his hand. There was a packet of narcotics in plain 
view, so I grabbed it." At the time the officer 
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made the seizure, he clearly had probable cause and 
a warrant is not needed because the officer had no 
opportunity to obtain one prior to the sudden appear-
ance of the contraband. The key here is that the 
activities prior to the seizure did not violate the 
fourth amendment. But if the initial stop is invalid 
under the fourth amendment, the whole matter falls. 
The fourth amendment does not restrict observation 
of matter in plain view provided the officer has a 
right to be in a position to obtain that view. An 
illegal "stop" may place him outside that category. 
Moreover, the material is only in plain view because 
abandoned and the abandonment stems from the stop. 
Assuming the validity of the stop, the frisk 
still must meet the limits imposed by the Court--a 
pat down for weapons, with no attempt, under Terry, 
to initially thrust hands into any pockets. Only 
after a weapon was felt did the officer reach into 
the pocket and remove the weapon. In this regard, 
I wonder how the courts will react when someone first 
demonstrates that guns don't always feel like guns. 
I have seen, for example, hollowed-out wallets that 
contained guns, yet feel like and have the appearance 
of an ordinary, rather stuffed wallet. Someday an 
officer is going to remove such a wallet, open it, 
and find that it contained marijuana, stolen jewels 
or some other contraband. The prosecutor had better 
be prepared to prove by exhibits that the officer 
reasonably could believe a weapon might be in such 
a case. Of course, this possibility, if recognized, 
would significantly increase that which might be 
removed in a frisk. 
PeopZe v. Evans? is a case that, in a way, may 
go beyond Terry. In the early morning in Detroit, 
police officers noticed a man walking rapidly down 
a street with a package. He apparently spotted the 
police and retreated into an alley, where they found 
him crouched behind some garbage cans. They knew of 
no crime that had been committed at that point. Yet 
they opened his package and found partially empty 
bottles of liquor. They reached into his pockets 
7. 3 Mich. App. 1 (1966). 
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and pulled out more bottles of liquor. They later 
found that there had been a liquor store robbery and 
that the liquor came from that store. Defense argued 
that the search had been illegal. It was without a 
warrant and not incident to any arrest, since there 
was no probable cause to make an arrest and an arrest 
had not been made. The Michigan Court of Appeals 
said that while there was no probable cause to make 
an arrest, there was probable cause to make a search 
without regard to the arrest. The basis for the 
lack of a warrant, I guess, was a ''moving vehicle" 
type of concept. Since he was not subject to arrest 
he could "move on." But even if this were accepted, 
the court is not altogether convincing in showing 
probable cause to search if one acknowledges lack 
of probable cause to arrest. To my knowledge, Evans 
has not been further developed in later cases. 
SeaPch Incident to an APPest 
As noted previously, the primary justification 
for the warrantless search of the person is the 
search-incident-to-a-valid-arrest exception. This 
exception is based upon the premise that the search 
must be undertaken immediately following arrest to 
insure that the arrested person does not have weapons 
and to prevent his possible destruction or conceal-
ment of weapons. Since the search is directed at 
more than weapons, it will be far more extensive 
than a frisk. But how extensive? Must the offense 
for which the arrest is made be such that the officer 
can believe that there is some evidence to be de-
stroyed? 
The Michigan Supreme Court has stated that when 
a man is stopped for a traffic violation, e.g., a 
bad headlight, ordinarily a search of the car cannot 
be made.8 The officer isn't likely to find evidence 
of a headlight violation or speeding violation in 
the car. Neither is he likely to find such evidence 
upon the driver's person, so a search of the person 
incident to such a stop would also appear to be in-
valid. Of course, this limitation does not neces-
8. People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247 (1959). 
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sarily apply to all misdemeanors. There may be some 
traffic offenses that justify a search of the person. 
If an individual is arrested for "driving while under 
the influence," he might possess evidence that could 
be destroyed or concealed, such as the intoxicant 
or its empty container. 
Assuming that the misdemeanor is of the type 
where evidence is not to be found, can the officer 
at least utilize a frisk? Does the Terry standard 
apply, or does the existence of the authority to 
arrest itself automatically justify a frisk for 
weapons? Language in GonzaZes or Terry would suggest 
that, at least where the individual is not placed 
in custody, the Terry standard applies. What if the 
person is placed in custody--e.g., placed in the 
police vehicle and taken to the station--rather than 
released at the scene after issuance of an appearance 
ticket? Does the officer have an automatic right 
to engage in a frisk, even where the offense involved 
is a misdemeanor, before placing a person in custody? 
This is an open issue. Neither GonzaZes nor similar 
cases deal with it. Certainly, one could not readily 
conclude that all persons taken into custody, by 
that fact alone, present a reasonable suspicion that 
they are armed. Yet, on the other hand, the arrested 
person placed in custody may be more likely to resort 
to force than the person who anticipates his on-site 
release. Also, the officer often is more vulnerable 
to attack when the arrested person is in the police 
vehicle. 
Most felonies are such that evidence may be 
found on the person, so problems of this sort don't 
arise with felony arrests. A general search of the 
person is usually justified; but how thoroughly may 
the officer search? If the man, for example, is 
arrested for automobile theft, can the officer look 
through his wallet or a pill box found on his pers~n? 
His wallet may very well contain some evidence (e.g., 
stolen registration papers), but the pill box is 
presumably too small to contain even such evidence. 
The courts have divided on this issue, some per-
mitting a thorough search of everything found on the 
person incident to the arrest. The Michigan appellate 
courts, to my knowledge, have stated only that you 
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can make a man empty his pockets upon his arrest 
and take everything that is presented. In People 
v. Jaokson,9 the arrested person was required to do 
exactly that and the officers seized ~ lighter which 
later was found to have been stolen from the robbery 
victim. The court upheld the admissibility of that 
evidence without any extensive discussion of the 
issue. 
Custodial Searoh 
One relevant factor here is the validity of 
the inventory or custodial search. Most persons 
arrested on felonies will be placed in jail for some 
period of time prior to arraignment on the warrant. 
Prior to being placed in a cell, their belongings 
will be removed and usually examined (i.e., pill 
boxes opened, contents of wallets examined, etc.). 
This is a standard practice, but it recently has 
been challenged, as to permissible scope, in the 
federal courts, with varying success. If the scope 
of the inventory search is limited, perhaps the court 
will be more willing to deal with the intensity of 
the search incident to a felony arrest because, any 
limitations will be more meaningful. On the other 
hand, if a thorough inventory search without warrant 
is justified as a necessary incident of custodial 
detention, it seems likely that the courts would 
also grant greater scope to searches incident to 
felony arrests on the ground that the matter seized 
would eventually be examined in the inventory search. 
one major problem related to search incident to 
arrest that has been directly answered is the requi-
site chronological order of the search and final 
arrest. The Michigan courts have recognized that 
the search is still incident to an arrest even if 
the officer stops, searches, and then tells the per-
son he is under arrest. The key is that the search 
and the arrest be contemporaneous and that the offi-
cer intend to arrest from the outset.lO 
9. 11 Mich. App. 630 (1968). 
10. People v. Pankin, 4 Mich. App. 19 (1966). 
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Search of a Car 
Let us move now to the search of the vehicle. 
Here a~ain, examination that falls short of a search 
will not require a warrant, or for that matter, even 
probable cause. The primary technique here is the 
observation of matter in plain view. (With respect 
to automobiles, I know of no counterpart to the 
frisk of the person.) Of course, the plain-view 
doctrine requires that the officer have legitimately 
been in a position that entitled him to have that 
view. In most reported cases, the officer observed 
matter within a car that he had stopped, but the 
stops were justified by traffic law violations.ll 
What if there had been no traffic violation? A 
state statute authorizes an officer to demand that 
a driver show his license. Can he legitimately 
stop any car for this purpose? Courts have upheld 
such "inspection stops" when applied to a group of 
vehicles selected on a random basis, but it is 
questionable whether the state can condition the 
right to drive on the relinquishment of at least 
that protection that would be afforded a pedestrian 
before an officer could single him out for the 
purpose of stopping him.l2 The issue remains open. 
Some have suggested that Henpyl3 holds that all 
individual vehicle stops constitute arrests and must 
be justified by probable cause. In HenPy, however, 
the government conceded the point, and Riosl4 indi-
cates the issue is open. It has largely been avoided 
because officers have been able, by one means or 
another, to find traffic violations that justify stops. 
SeaPch Incident to an APPest 
When it comes to physical search of the car 
without a warrant, the primary justification advanced 
in prior cases has been that the search was incident 
11. See e.~., People v. Kuntze, 371 Mich. 419 (1963). 
12. See discussion of Terry, supPa. 
13. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). 
14. Rios v. United States, 364 u.s. 253 (1960). 
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to an arrest. As noted previously, this is limited 
by the type of arrest. Traffic arrests ordinarily 
do not permit searches incident thereto. In People 
v. Lee,l5 police stopped a driver for one traffic 
offense and the officer requested that he get out 
of the car so the officer could check the car brakes. 
The officer pushed aside a cushion in the front seat 
as he entered the car and found a revolver there. 
The court said that because the man had violated one 
traffic rule, relating to lights, that did not create 
probable cause to believe that there was a violation 
also relating to the brakes. Since the entry for 
that purpose was illegal, the discovery of weapons 
incident thereto was an invalid search (this was not 
plain view, as a cushion was removed). 
If the arrest is for a felony, the possibility 
usually exists that evidence of the crime might be 
within the possession of the arrested person. The 
scope of that search is so limited, however. Chimel 
v. Californial6 suggests that the search may only 
extend to the area within the person's control--the 
area into which he might reach in order to grasp a 
weapon or evidentiary item. This seemingly would 
exclude a locked glove compartment or the trunk of 
a car incident to arrest. Indeed, it might not reach 
the front seat if the person has been removed from 
the car when the search is made, as that area is no 
longer within his in~ediate control. Thus, after 
Chimel, the problem considered in cases like Foster,l1 
Johnnie Mae Jones,l8 and Dombrowski 19 may no longer 
be of practical significance for post-Chimel searches. 
In Dombrowski the defendant was arrested and his car 
was searched at that point, but the officers could 
not find the key to the trunk because he had hidden 
it. At the station, the key was found in the process 
of a custodial search of the person. The officers 
then returned to the car and opened up the trunk. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals said that the officers 
15. 371 Mich. 573 (1963). 
16. 395 u.s. 752 (1969). 
17. People v. Foster, 17 Mich. App. 430 (1969). 
18. People v. Johnnie Mae Jones, 12 Mich. App. 
367 (1968). 
19. People v. Dombrowski, 10 Mich. App. 445 (1968). 
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should have obtained a warrant, since the search was 
no longer incident to the arrest. In Jones the 
defendant was taken into custody and transported to 
the station and the officers returned immediately 
to search the car. The court of Appeals viewed this 
as a borderline case and held the search incident 
to the arrest after noting that the police were 
subject to harrassment that may have prevented an 
immediate search. They also noted that defendant 
had not been booked. It was possible that a search 
might not reveal any relevant evidence and defendant 
might have been released. Since the defendant was 
not present in either case, Chimel indicates neither 
search could be sustained today as incident to an 
arrest. Authority to search without a warrant in 
such cases must come from another "exception," and 
that exception is the "moving vehicle" exception 
noted in Chambers v. Maroney.20 
"Moving Vehiale" Exaeption 
Police officers in Chambers were investigating 
a recent gasoline station robbery when they stopped 
a car with probable cause to believe the driver and 
passengers had been involved in the robbery. But 
they did not search the car at that point. They 
took the men to the station and booked them, then 
went back to search the car and found weapons and 
stolen identification cards. The Court said the 
search was not incident to arrest, but was still 
justified without a warrant since the vehicle was 
capable of being moved and there was therefore no 
opportunity to obtain a warrant. The police had not 
impounded the car and they could not be required to 
do so as an alternative to the search. Although the 
driver and passengers were in custody, this did not 
preclude others from taking the car. The Court 
stressed, however, that the search, since it was not 
justified by the arrest, was based upon the existence 
of probable cause relating to the car itself--probable 
cause that it contained relevant evidence, since it 
apparently had been used in the robbery only a few 
hours before. Probable cause relating to the car will 
not exist in all cases involving felony arrests. In 
20. 399 u.s. 42 (1970). 
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PeopZe v. Carter, 21 the Michigan appellate court 
indicated that Chambers would apply to an automobile 
that had apparently been used in the robbery several 
hours before. Although there had been some oppor-
tunity to remove contraband, probable cause to believe 
that the car contained contraband would still exist. 
But what if there had been no evidence that the car 
had been used in the robbery? Can we ordinarily 
assume that it is a logical place to have loot 
stored, as would be the horne? What if the crime does 
not involve loot (e.g., a rape) and did not occur 
in the car? Can we nevertheless treat it as a likely 
source of evidence, such as fingerprints or footprints 
that might match those found at the scene of the 
crime? Also, how much time may elapse before the 
search is undertaken? In Carter, the officers 
waited three days after initially seizing the car. 
The justification for the lack of warrant in 
Maroney was the possible removal of the car, but 
this delay in the search certainly indicated no such 
concern. The officers had ample time to obtain a 
warrant, and the court of appeals stated Chambers, 
therefore,would not apply (reversal was not required, 
however, because admission of the evidence seized 
was harmless error). The same difficulty might arise 
when the officers had ample time to obtain a warrant 
before they sought out a car to be searched. For 
example, what if, in Chambers, they had been aware 
of Mr. Chambers' involvement in the crime several 
days before they stopped him, but had failed to 
obtain a warrant to search the car? Can they now 
justify a search without a warrant on the ground 
that their "hand" has now been "tipped," and the 
car might be removed before they can get the warrant? 
CustodiaZ Examination of a Car 
One other significant exception to the warrant 
requirement is the custodial examination of a car. 
If the car is impounded, i.e., it is seized as police 
property subject to forfeiture as in narcotics cases, 
then it is in police custody and a subsequent search 
without a warrant may be justified, though days later, 
21. 28 Mich. App. 83 (1970). 
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on an inventory theory. 22 The CoopeP case was 
extended in People v. Cook23 to an automobile that 
had been impounded as the instrumentality utilized 
in a child molesting offense. The court there argued, 
in effect, that since the entire car was seized as 
evidence, the more thorough examination at a later 
date did not constitute a new search. The crucial 
issue was the authority to seize the car and that 
was justified by probable cause that it had been 
used in the offense. I wonder how far the court 
will carry this doctrine. Certainly, it would not 
be applied to a "seizure" of a house in which an 
offense occured at the time of arrest and then a 
subsequent search of the house without a warrant. A 
crucial aspect in Cook may be that the subsequent 
"search" was no more than the removal of fingerprints 
found on various portions of the car. In both Cook 
and CoopeP, the utilization of the car in the com-
mission of a felony to which the evidence related 
was important. The D.C. Court of Appeals has held 
that contraband found in a car impounded following 
a minor traffic offense was not admissible.24 
The limitations of the ChambePs doctrine as 
well as CoopeP are indicated by the Supreme Court 
decision in Coolidge v. New HampshiPe,25 which came 
after this lecture was delivered. In that case, the 
police had obtained probable cause to believe that 
the defendant had murdered a young female. They 
did obtain a warrant authorizing search of the car, 
before they went to defendant's house, where he was 
arrested. The car was located in the driveway at 
the time. It was subsequently towed to the police 
station and there searched. Vacuum sweepings from 
the car were introduced into evidence at trial. The 
warrant was held to be invalid since it was not 
issued by "a neutral and detached magistrate," but 
rather by the state attorney general, who was acting 
in his capacity as a "justice of the peace.'' A 
majority of the Court also held that the search could 
22. See Cooper v. California, 386 u.s. 58 (1967). 
23. 24 Mich. App. 401 (1970). 
24. Mayfield v. United States,9 Cr. Law Rptr. 2115 
(1971). 
25. 399 u.s. 926 (1970). 
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not be justified without a warrant. The major 
opinion on this issue was joined by only four jus-
tices. They rejected application of the Chambers 
decision on the ground that the police had known of 
the probable role of the car for some time, the 
petitioner had had ample opportunity to destroy any 
incriminating evidence in the car, the house had 
been guarded at the time of the arrest, and the 
petitioner and his spouse had been denied any access 
to the car. The prosecution also sought to argue 
that the car had been seized as a matter in plain 
view, presumably as an instrument of the crime, and 
that the subsequent search was therefore valid. The 
four justices argued, however, that the plain-view 
doctrine could not be applied to the seizure of the 
car as a whole. This was not a case where the police 
officer inadvertently carne across evidence in the 
process of an otherwise valid search. Here again 
the justices emphasized that the police had ample 
opportunity to obtain a warrant; they knew the auto-
mobile's exact description and location well in 
advance; they had intended to seize it when they 
first came upon defendant's property; and the car 
was not contraband or stolen goods or an object dan-
gerous in itself. The fifth justice, Justice Harlan, 
concurred in the conclusion that the search could 
not be justified without a warrant, but did not join 
in all of the reasoning of the plurality opinion. 
He did state, however, that a ''contrary result in 
this case would, I fear, go far towards relegating 
the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment to 
a position of little consequence in federal search 
and seizure law, a course which seems to be opposite 
to the one we took in ChimeZ." 
Search of a Building 
Let me now turn to the third area of concern--
the search of the building. Here again, almost all 
of the exceptions noted previously will come into 
play. Plain view will be a significant justification, 
but, again, its validity depends upon a lawful ini-
tial entry into the house that placed the officer 
in a position to have that plain view. In this area, 
perhaps the most significant current question is 
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whether officers may enter a house for the purpose 
of making an arrest without previously having ob-
tained an arrest warrant, despite the fact that 
opportunity to obtain the warrant was present. The 
Michigan Court of Appeals suggested that an arrest 
warrant will not be necessary in such a situation.26 
The issue was recently noted by the United States 
Supreme Court in Coolidge, with the majority indi-
cating that it was an 1'open" issue. 
Assuming that we have a "full-fledged search" 
rather than an observation justified under the plain-
view doctrine, there is very limited scope for a 
search without a warrant. Under the Chimel case, as 
previously noted, the search, if justified as inci-
dent to an arrest, is limited to the area within the 
immediate control of the arrestee. Presumably this 
frequently would not even extend to a bookshelf or 
desk located across the room. Of course, if the 
arrestee is permitted to go into another room, or 
to open a drawer (e.g., for the purpose of removing 
clothing) the ~alice may search that area prior to 
such activity. 7 
So far, the court has been unwilling, with 
respect to the homes, to recognize a doctrinal coun-
terpart of the moving vehicle exception--an exception 
justifying search of a home without a warrant when 
there is a possibility that another returning to the 
home would seize any evidence located there before 
the officers could obtain a warrant. This issue was 
presented, at least in part, in the Vale case.28 
In that case, petitioner was arrested on the porch, 
and his house was subsequently searched. The attempt 
to justify the search as incident to the arrest was 
easily rejected, even though the search occurred 
before Chimel and therefore was not subject to that 
ruling. Justice Black, in dissent, argued that the 
police should have been permitted to search the 
house on the thesis that Vale's mother and brother 
26. See People v. Herrera, 19 Mich. App. 216 (1969). 
But aompare Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 
385 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
27. See People v. Giacalone, 23 Mich. App. 163 (1970). 
28. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 u.s. 30 (1970). 
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had arrived shortly after the arrest and were aware 
of Vale's arrest for an alleged narcotics transfer. 
Presumably, they would also be aware of narcotics 
in the home and could destroy such narcotics while 
the police officers were obtaining a warrant. The 
majority did not respond directly to this point, 
although they did note that at the time the officers 
first entered the premises, and presumably began the 
search, the mother and brother had not yet arrived. 
Certainly, a reasonable implication of the opinion 
is that the officers should have either prevented 
the mother and brother from entering the home until 
they could obtain a warrant, or one officer might 
have remained with the mother and brother while they 
sought the warrant. While one might argue that the 
same procedures could often be applied to automobile 
searches, the court's opinions indicate that they 
do not view privacy within the automobile as nearly 
as significant as that within the home. 
If Vale had evaded arrest on the front porch 
and had gone into the home, the police officers 
presumably could have followed him "in hot pursuit" 
and might have seized any item which they found in 
plain view. Indeed, under Warden v. Hayden,29 they 
presumably could have searched for any weapons which 
might be seized while they were in the process of 
looking for him. In Warden, in the pursuit of a 
suspect, an officer looked inside a washing machine, 
apparently to find weapons, and discovered a bloody 
shirt,which he seized. In the Carter case, the 
officers,while pursuing a fleeing felon, seized a 
pair of red shoes smeared with white paint and a 
brown paper sack containing money. However, the 
court there excluded evidence which was seized after 
the officers had made a determination that the sus-
pect had left the building and the apartment was 
properly secured by officers. At that time, before 
conducting a further search, they should have ob-
tained a warrant. 
Much more could be said concerning the search 
of the building. Because of the shortage of time, 
29. 387 u.s. 294 (1967). 
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I have not treated it as extensively as the search 
of a person or the automobile. A general rule, one 
can safely say, is that the likelihood of justifying 
a search o;f a building without a warrant is far less 
than that of justifying a warrantless search either 
of the person or of the automobile. 
